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Abstract. In this paper, we introduce a privacy-enhanced Peer Manager,
which is a fundamental building block for the implementation of a privacy-
preserving collective adaptive systems computing platform. The Peer
Manager is a user-centered identity management platform that keeps
information owned by a user private and is built upon an attribute-based
privacy policy. Furthermore, this paper explores the ethical, privacy and
social values aspects of collective adaptive systems and their extensive
capacity to transform lives. We discuss the privacy, social and ethical
issues around profiles and present their legal privacy requirements from
the European legislation perspective.
1 Introduction
Smart Society, an eu fp7 fet integrated project, explores how Collective Adap-
tive System (cas) comprised of people and machines may help solve problems
of urban living. Smart Society aims to capture how contemporary techno-social
trends can be harnessed towards solving challenges facing modern society. The
Smart alludes to how innovative, social, mobile and sensor based technologies
can support powerful collectives of people and machines that are capable of
utilizing constrained shared resources, such as, such as transport networks, in
more effective and therefore sustainable ways.
Smart Society is partly inspired by the idea of the ‘Smart City’, a multifaceted
concept that recognizes the benefits of urban living but also the strains that
are developing on existing infrastructures and resources due to urban growth.
According to this vision, cities made ‘smart’ will be more productive, more
sustainable, and pleasanter places to live. One aspect of Smart Cities concerns
augmenting service infrastructures, such as transport, energy and health, with
sensor-based digital technologies that are able to visualize patterns of service
? This research was funded by SmartSociety, a project of the Seventh Framework Pro-
gramme for Research of the European Community under grant agreement no. 600854.
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delivery and use stretching across space and time and with a high degree of
fidelity. The idea is that service operators can utilize this information to make
efficiency savings by tailoring provision to match demand, and by shaping demand
through use of incentives or other motivating feedback mechanisms. At the same
time, users of shared resources can use those resources more effectively if they
are aware of the global state of the resource and able to coordinate between
themselves about how the resource might be used.
An objective of Smart Society is to identify problems related to cas and design
solutions to preempt them. In the case of protection of personal data, Smart
Society identified a set of potential problems in cas, including: user profiling,
‘big data’ analysis of personal data acquired from mobile devices, and the use of
analytic technologies that reveal user actions, such as activity recognition–all of
which resonate strongly contemporary ict-based privacy challenges. We aim to
explore how far state-of-the-art privacy enhancing technologies, such as privacy
policy languages, anonymous credentials, and data anonymization techniques,
may find an application within Smart Society, focusing particularly on practical
implementation issues and how their use trades-off against other important social
values, such as accountability and security.
1.1 Smart Society and Collectives
A key principle in Smart Society is founded on the idea of ‘collectives’–a collection
of humans and / or machines that identify themselves as a group. In Smart Society,
collectives are seen as a source of expertise and discoverable via peer profiles. At
the same time they are consumers of resources whose patterns of consumption
can be shaped by appropriate interventions such as incentives. Diversity within
collectives provides a resource pool to enable a collective develop a range of
responses to a situation, but can also be a source of friction and contention.
Taking these elements together, the socio-technical entity powering the Smart
Society vision is referred to as a Hybrid and Diversity Aware Collective Adaptive
System (hda-cas).
Since collective adaptive systems comprise people and machines that seam-
lessly collaborate to solve problems and execute tasks, a computing platform
that supports a cas has as input two sets of data about:
1. problems and tasks,
2. peers, i.e., people and/or machines.
The objective of a cas computing platform is to match these two sets in a way that
the specific problems are re-directed to the group of peers that are most capable,
interested and / or efficient in solving them. Thus, a cas computing platform
needs access to the attributes of all peers stored in peer profiles. However,
unlimited access to the peers’ attributes in the peer profiles is not desirable
because they may include personal data in the case of peers that are people. The
collection, storage and processing of personal data is subject to legislation. The
cas computing platform therefore has to accommodate requirements and should
be designed upon a privacy-preserving framework.
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1.2 Contributions
This paper summarizes the presentations and discussion results of a workshop by
the Smart Society project that was held at the ifip Summer School on Privacy
and Identity Management in September 2014. We first discuss the ethical and
legal aspects and requirements in regard to peer profiling in Smart Society.
Then we outline the first steps for realizing a privacy-preserving cas computing
platform. We present a semantic schema for the representation of peers’ personal
data and Peer Manager, which is a distributed database that stores the peers’
personal data. Our contribution sets the minimum requirements for the design
and implementation of an attribute-based access control privacy policy for a
privacy-preserving cas computing platform.
In the remainder of this paper, we begin by describing the contextual back-
ground and ethical and privacy aspects of cas computing platform that are
introduced in Section 2. Section 3 outlines the privacy requirements taken into
account in our research work. The semantic schema and the Peer Manager are
presented in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes our work and findings as well as
the results of the workshop discussions during the summer school.
2 Ethical and Privacy Issues
In this section we explore how the Smart Society project pays attention to issues
of privacy, ethics and social values, and expands upon issues associated more
generally with ‘big data’ and profiling driven approaches. In particular, we draw
attention to the extensive scope of the Smart Society vision and its extensive
capacity to transform our lives to highlight the importance of paying close
attention to these issues. To do this we draw on existing literature detailing the
ethical challenge that now confront us from increasing levels of digital mediation
within our everyday lives.
The reference to ‘Society’ in the Smart Society name underlines the extensive
ambition of the project. Examples and scenarios generated within the project
encompass Tourism, Care, Health, Policing and span from grand aims of solving
problems of sustainability to assisting the mundane practicalities of finding
somewhere to eat in an unfamiliar town. This breadth and depth underlines
the vast scope and everyday pervasiveness implied by the ambition of a ‘Smart
Society’ that aims to address ‘societal challenges’ and operate at ‘internet scale’
whilst at the same time penetrating into the mundane aspects of many of
our everyday routines and activities. The aim is not to leave these activities
unaltered, but rather to supercharge them by linking individuals into collectives
to access collectives’ problem solving and self-organizing abilities, and to draw
upon portable devices, sensors, data and algorithms to assist in ‘orchestrating’
these newly collectivized activities. Part of the motivation for Smart Society
stems from the perception that the existing accumulations of digital mediation
for everyday activities have until now been technically untidy, due to a lack of
appropriate engineering principles, and ethically haphazard, as a consequence of
being unplanned and undirected. Hence Smart Society’s twin foci on engineering
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and ethics. Improved engineering is seen to address the problem of ethics by
providing a structured and therefore more considered process for creating such
systems. Ethics helps solve engineering problems by guiding the engineers towards
solutions that preserve certain important social values, such as privacy.
In the context of an increasingly digitally augmented lives, the performance
of everyday activities now involves numerous data streams leading to vast ac-
cumulations of data. This data is viewed as a resource towards solving a wide
array of social problems, but its misuse is also seen as threatening our privacy
and autonomy. Goodman analyzes ethical issues in the era of personal ’big data’
draws attention to the following attributes that carry these types of risk: [11]:
– “The sensor infused world”. The shear array of sensors, devices and increas-
ingly everyday objects interconnected via online infrastructures passively
generating increasing quantities of data from an ever wider range of activities.
– “Data as commodity”. As data has become valuable in its own right beyond
the services which generated leading to important questions as to who gets
to realize value from data and for what purposes? Nissenbaum’s concept
of ‘data integrity’ maintains that use of data should be consistent with the
values attached to the activities producing the data [17].
– “Opacity of back-end information exchange”. The many ways by which data
circulates and are traded are hidden from view, as are the ultimate purposes
to which those data may be put. So the ways that such data are subsequently
used to filter or shape our experience of the world are often concealed.
– “Mass scale”. How this is happening on an unprecedented scale and in ways
that do not differentiate between diverse cultural expectations about privacy
and data use.
Smart Society could be prone to the hazards described by Goodman for social
platforms if data is similarly centralized and its stewardship remains in the hands
of platform operators. Providing tools and policies that extend control of data
to users and that bind operators to principles of transparency are important
challenges for Smart Society - particularly where this creates technical and
operational inconveniences.
In the era of personal ’big data’ it is common to use data to profile individuals
and stratify populations as a means to tailoring or individualizing experience, e.g.
by targeting advertising, creating recommendations or tailoring services. Profiles
are used within Smart Society to involve peers in collectives, perhaps to solve
problems, based upon their experience, skills and reputation. We describe below
the importance of profiles for Smart Society but first we enumerate some of the
hazards of profiling already identified in the literature.
2.1 Social and Ethical Issues of Profiles
– Social sorting. Social Sorting refers to how profiling technologies sorts indi-
viduals into categories in order to affect their experiences and opportunities.
Examples include banks routing calls from wealthier customers deliver speed-
ier service at the expense of less well off customers or internet service providers
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giving priority to certain traffic or favored customers. Negative effects of
sorting include reinforcing existing social divisions and creating new yet
invisible hierarchies of access and privilege [16].
– Autonomy and self-determination. Often profiles are created and used without
our knowledge or consent, and the ways that our experience of services is
modified by profiling is typically invisible. Where profiles are computed from
data about us, then we are subject the the values embedded in the algorithms
used to sift that information, but not given a voice in the creation of those
algorithms. When we create profiles (e.g. on Linkedin or Facebook) then we
are still constrained by what we can express and have little control over how
much a flat partial identity may be read by others as a literal depiction of
who we are.
– Diminishing diversity. “With commercial personalization services, the myriad
of individual differences is reduced to one or a few consuming categories,
on the basis of which their preferences, character, life-style and so forth
are determined for a specific context. Because of its tendency to general-
ize, personalization may lead to diminishing preferences, differences and
values...” [12]. A question raised during the Patras workshop underlines this
point. The questioner characterized our experience of city life as in turns
vivid, serendipitous, frustrating and pleasurable and questioned how city life
mediated through Smart Society ‘apps’ may lead to a dulling, standardisation
and impoverishment of these sorts of experience. It is important for Smart
Society to retain elements of fun, chance, discovery and provide an experience
that is enriching to and complementary to existing beneficial forms of city
life, and avoid the tendency of computer science to frame problems narrowly
in terms of optimization.
Profiles are a crucial component within the Smart Society platform and it
is the Peer Profile which gives participants their identity within the system
and thereby governs the relationship between individuals and the collectives in
which they may become involved. The Smart Society Peer Profile codifies the
participant’s reputation, interests, expertise and actions. The system uses this
information to work out if it can recruit the ‘peer’ to contribute to solving a
problem. In this way the peer profile plays a role in determining participants’
opportunities within the system. Given the extent of Smart Society vision then
this could imply significant advantages or deficits in life-chances where profiles
govern participants’ access to culture, education, healthcare and their ability to
engage in economic activity. In the context of Smart Society then peoples’ very
participation in civil society may be at stake.
Some risks of privacy profiling within Smart Society are being addressed
in Smart Society, as it is presented in the following sections of this paper. In
particular, risks to autonomy are addressed by creating mechanisms that give
the participant ownership of their profile by hosting it on their device; allowing
the user to edit or amend any aspect; and in specifying policies describing in
what circumstances the data may be shared across the platform.
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2.2 Privacy Issues of Profiles
Peer profiling may affect privacy in different respects. As the Council of Europe
has discussed in its recommendation cm/rec(2010)13 on profiling [4], the col-
lection, linking, calculation, comparison and statistical correction of data with
the objective to create profiles may have significant privacy impacts, as profiling
enables a person’s personality, behavior, interests and habits to be determined,
analyzed and/or predicted. Often such profiling is even happening without the
knowledge of the individuals concerned. While profiling may offer benefits for
users and society at large, e.g. by providing users with targeted and better
services addressing personal and societal interests or by permitting an analysis of
risks and fraud, profiling techniques can also have the impact on the individuals
concerned by placing them in predetermined categories and may unjustifiably
deprive them from accessing certain services and by this discriminate individuals,
a we also pointed out above [4].
Moreover, profiling techniques do not only allow to analyze data that are
actually recorded, but also allow to statistically predict or implicitly derive
information from such records. For instance, sensitive data including about
political opinions, religious beliefs, intelligence or sexual orientation can be
automatically predicted from Facebook Likes (see e.g., [13]).
During the workshop at Patras, the following more specific privacy questions,
mostly related to peer profiling, were raised and discussed, but not finally an-
swered, which implies that they still largely remain challenges to be addressed
within Smart Society:
– How can privacy interests of “collectives” (consisting of several individu-
als and/or machines) be protected? How can collectives be formed in an
anonymous manner, i.e. in a way that it does not relate to any identified
or identifiable person? Can privacy policy languages (to be discussed in the
next section) be extended to define privacy preferences of Collectives and
negotiate privacy policies for Collectives? Is it a challenge to define/jointly
agree on privacy preferences for Collectives in regard to personal data that
they have in common/share, or can group decisions and crowdsourcing on
privacy preference settings enable/motivate users to spend more efforts on
privacy preference management?
– In hybrid systems, peer profiles of machines could include personal data of
one or even several data subjects. For instance, in the application of Smart
Society to a care scenario, sensors may capture data about when and for
how long health care professionals and patients have met. This implies that
the sensor readings may reveal both personal information about health care
professionals and the patients. Under which conditions can data subjects of
data relating also to other data subjects can exercise their data subject rights
(if for example the data is only intended for the health care professionals to
organise their work, the patient (or their relatives) may still have the right
to access data items that relate to them (e.g., to check whether the patient
gets the right treatment)?).
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– Are anonymous credentials suitable pets (privacy-enhancing technologies)
for enhancing the privacy of passengers and drivers participating in a Smart
Society enabled ‘ride sharing’ platform that is currently under implementa-
tion? Both drivers and passengers could be pseudonymously be registered
by the platform and prove only certain properties (e.g., passion of driving
license for more than five years, reputation scores). Will the use of anonymous
credentials in this context be practically feasible and socially accepted?
Privacy-related questions concerning privacy on sensor data collection [3],
trust and reputation [15], and provenance [5] were also raised. These topics are
being addressed by Smart Society and are not discussed in this paper.
3 Legal Privacy Requirements in Regard to Profiling
In this section we present the requirements for a cas computing platform that
accommodate data protection and it is designed upon a privacy preserving
framework. Basic legal privacy principles, especially those enacted by the eu
Data Protection Directive 95/46/ec [7], need to be enforced when profiles that
include personal data are created and processed.
These basic principles comprise the following:
– Legitimacy & informed consent: The collection and processing of per-
sonal data in profiles needs to be legitimate, which usually implies that the
data subjects4 have given their informed consent (Art. 7).
– Purpose specification & binding: Personal data used in the context of
profiling must be collected for specified and legitimate purposes and may
later only be used for those purposes (Art. 6 Ib).
– Data minimization: The amount of personal data and the extent to which
they are collected and processed in profiles should be minimized (Art. 6 Ic),
i.e., if possible data in profiles should be anonymised or pseudonymised.
– No sensitive data: The collection and processing of so-called special cat-
egories of data in the context of profiling should in principle be prohibited
(Art. 8 I), unless the exceptions of Art. 8 II apply.
– Transparency & data subject rights: Data controllers5 have to provide
the data subjects with sufficient privacy policy information pursuant to
Art. 10 when personal data are collected in the context of profiling. Data
subjects have the right to to obtain information about their personal data,
to be informed about the logic underpinning the processing of their data, to
correction, deletion and blocking of their data, and not to be subject to a
“decision which produces legal effects concerning him or significantly affects
him and which that is based solely on automated processing of data intended
to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to him, such as his performance
at work, creditworthiness, reliability, conduct, etc.”.
4 A data subject is a natural person about whom personal data are processed. We use
the terms data subjects, users, and individuals concerned interchangeably.
5 According to eu Directive 95/5/ec, a data controller is an entity that alone or jointly
with others determines the purposes and means of personal data processing.
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– Security: The data controller has to implement proper technical and orga-
nizational security measures for the protection of personal profile data.
The Council of Europe proposed more specific privacy principles that should
further strengthen the data subject’s protection in an appendix to its recommen-
dation cm/rec(2010)13.
In the context of the eu data protection reform, the proposed General eu
Data Protection Regulation (gdpr) [8] introduced with its Art. 20 “Measures
based on Profiling”. This was however criticized by the Art. 29 Data Protection
Working Party on focusing merely on the outcome of profiling rather than on
the profiling as such [1].
The compromise amendment to the proposed eu Data Protection Regulation
[6], which was passed by the libe Committee (Committee on Civil Liberties,
Justice and Home Affairs) of the European Parliament on October 21, 2013,
has taken up this proposal by providing greater transparency and control for
data subjects. According to the amended Art. 14 (ga), data controllers should
provide “information about the existence of profiling, of measures based on
profiling, and the envisaged effects of profiling on the data subject”. In addition,
the amended proposal includes the right for data subjects to object to profiling
(Art. 20 I). Furthermore, pursuant to Art. 20 III, “profiling that has the effect of
discriminating against individuals on the basis of race or ethnic origin, political
opinions, religion or beliefs, trade union membership, sexual orientation or gender
identity, or that results in measures which have such effect, shall be prohibited”.
Pursuant to Art. 20 V, “Profiling which leads to measures producing legal effects
concerning the data subject or does similarly significantly affect the interests,
rights or freedoms of the concerned data subject shall not be based solely or
predominantly on automated processing and shall include human assessment,
including an explanation of the decision reached after such an assessment.”
The amendment text to the gdpr also introduced in Art. 4 (2a) the concept
of “pseudonymous data”, which it defines as “personal data that cannot be
attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, as
long as such additional information is kept separately and subject to technical and
organisational measures to ensure non-attribution”. Recital 58a of the amendment,
further states that profiling based solely on the processing of pseudonymous
data that cannot be attributed to a specific person should be presumed not to
significantly affect the interests, rights or freedoms of the data subject.
4 Concept for a Privacy-enhanced Peer Manager
We define information peers as equally privileged participants in an information
exchange. Subjects (i.e., humans, machines and services) are represented by
informational peers, which interact under a common set of rules, and can be both
providers and subscribers of different information exchanges at different times.
They are considered equally privileged with regard to the decision of engaging
or not in the information exchange given the set of rules that apply to such
interaction.
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Personal data protection is embedded in the design of the Peer Manager and
its implementation, the Peer Manager Platform. To address the privacy issues
raised in previous sections, the Peer Manager follows three core guiding principles
for technically protecting privacy:
1. Well-defined information separation between information owned by different
subjects. For guaranteeing that the subjects control their own data, the Peer
Manager creates distributed environments that host the knowledge container
of each subject. Therefore, as the knowledge containers can be physically and
logically distributed, the personal information of a subject is isolated from
the personal information of other subjects.
2. User-centred identity management. The Peer Manager gives to each subject
the control of the flow over personally identifying information. Furthermore,
the identity management system allows subjects the definition and use
of different pseudonyms for different interactions as part of their partial
identities.
3. A deconstruction and re-imagining of information profiling. While the high-
level objective of the Peer Manager’s Profiles is in general the same as the one
of traditional profiles (i.e. an information-holding structure that is maintained
and updated separately from the subject to which it refers), we have focused
on turning around the regular profiling practices by making them transparent
and controllable by the subjects that they refer to.
For enhancing management of information and allowing to enforce the privacy
requirements of purpose specification and binding, we define the Peer Manager
on top of an entity-centric semantic enhanced model that is presented in the next
subsection.
4.1 Preliminaries
In the Peer Manager, the representation of information related to peers builds
upon the notion of a semantic schema defining an attribute-based representation
of peers’ characteristics. The semantic schema we adopt follows an entity-centric
approach that uses the notion of entity to refer to a “thing” that exists in the real
world. Within the peer manger we formalize this notion of entity and use it, as
the basic element representing information about peers. We distinguish between
a schema level that defines the “format” to represent information and a instance
level that defines how to instantiate the schema into actual knowledge [10,14].
A Knowledge Base (KB) stores data from the schema level. The Schema.org6
initiative defines schemas as “a set of types, each associated with a set of properties
and where the types are arranged in a hierarchy”. We adopt an approach that
is aligned with this idea and allows the definition of templates for each type of
entity used in the system. These templates allows to establish restrictions on
the set of attributes that can be used to describe a given type of entity. The
meaning is further specified by mapping single elements from the schema (i.e.,
6 http://schema.org/
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types of entities, the names of attributes and their values) to concepts from the
underlying ontology that is also part of the same knowledge base.
– A concept is “an idea of what something is or how it works.”7 In the area
of knowledge representation, concepts are used to formalize and represent
the meaning of words in a language independent manner. Concepts can be
mapped to an underlying ontology that greatly helps identifying purposes
(for purpose binding) and other hard to manage limitations for the shared
information (e.g., alignment between different data sources). It also provides
the basis for more accurate access control methodologies as introduced in [2,9].
– An entity type ET provides a template for the creation of entities by
establishing a set of constraints about the metadata (i.e., attributes) that
entities of that type can instantiate. The template for attributes are defined by
mean of the so-called attribute definitions. An attribute definition AD imposes
an explicit constraint about the name and the quantitative or qualitative
values of a certain attribute that can be associated to an entity.
An entity base (EB) is defined to store information corresponding to the
instance level. It includes concrete information about abstract and physical
entities that exist in the real world and is represented by the following elements.
– An entity (E) is defined as an abstract or physical object, it can be of
different types defined at the knowledge level (e.g., person, location, event,
etc.) and is described by attributes (e.g., name, birth date, latitude-longitude,
size, duration, etc.), which can be different for different types of entities.
– An attribute (A) instantiates an attribute definition AD to represent a
particular characteristic of the entity. Some attributes may have multiple
values, its values may be mapped to a meaning in some knowledge base (i.e.,
semantic values) or can represent a relation to another entity when the value
is a reference to another E (i.e., relational attribute).
4.2 Privacy-enhancing Structures
The three main structures used in the Peer Manager to protect personal data
are: the peer, the user, and the profile structures. These three structures are
presented in this section.
Peers as distributed storage providers. Peer structures are units of stor-
age under the control of the Peer Manager Platform and of the subjects that
participate in it. The Peer Manager keeps an entity’s data and knowledge base.
Every entity has a Peer Manager and defines the access control policies related
to their data. The default policy is the most restrictive one, i.e., the data is
available only to the entity that owns it. An entity’s data is kept isolated from
the rest. Therefore, the Peer Manager helps to promote the privacy principle of
informational self-determination.
7 Merriam-Webster (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/concept).
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When an entity registers to the platform, it is assigned a peer structure
defined as the the tuple P = 〈ID,KB,EB,ME, {U}〉 where:
– ID is a unique identifier and a reference number to a peer;
– KB is the id of the Knowledge Base owned by the peer that will be used to
store all of the concepts and Etypes that belong to the peer;
– EB is the id of the Entity Base owned by the peer that will be used to store
all of the Entities that belong to the peer;
– ME is the id of the Main Entity of the peer and it is stored in EB. In the
case of a person, the main entity is a person entity. There are other types of
main entity, such as for service peers and collective peers; and
– {U} is a non-empty set of user structures, which is defined below.
The peer structure thus allows each subject in the system to have its own
dedicated storages (to which then they can apply their own policies and AC
directives) as shown in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. A Platform handled by the Peer Manager. Each subject its assigned its own
peer storage, while the platform itself offers a shared Knowledge and Entity storages
for different interactions.
Fig. 1 shows that each Peer has its own PKB (Peer Knowledge Base) and
PEB (Peer Entity Base) assigned and clearly separated from the other peers
and the platform. The design of the Peer Manager infrastructure also states
that only the subject in control of Peer structure has access to it by default
and allows for each of these Peers to be stored either in the same server or in
different machines altogether. Through this, the platform guarantees that each
subject will be always in control of the information stored in his/her assigned
peer and that nobody (not even the platform holders) would be able to access
this information unless given access by the same subject.
Users structures as subject pseudonyms. When interacting with other
peers registered in the platform, entities have the option to control the amount
of personal data they reveal. User structures (corresponding to pseudonyms that
a subject can act under) are introduced to enhance the privacy of all the subjects
that participate in actions/interactions in the Smart Society platform. Entities
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Fig. 2. User structures are used instead of the Main Entity when it acts as a subject
and profile structures are used for when the Main Entity is read as an object.
are able to define N user structures (corresponding to N different pseudonyms)
defined as tuples U = 〈UN,AUTH,P,MPD, {PD}〉, where:
– UN is an alphanumeric string used as the unique identifier to the user
structure. This string is a pseudonym for the entity that controls the peer;
– AUTH is an authentication token that is issued by the platform as a proof
of peer’s identity;
– P is the id of the peer to which a user structure corresponds.
– MPD is the id of the Main profile definition structure that is applied to the
peer’s ME. It is used to obfuscate (by pseudonymization or anonymization)
the link between user structure and the peer that owns it. The resulting Entity
Profile is associated to the user structure and (depending on its configuration)
may provide none to full identification of the entity that controls it;
– {PD} a possibly empty set of profile definitions that subjects create for
their entities (e.g. their events, physical and logical objects, and other partial
identities) that are linked to the current user structure.
The left side of Fig. 2 shows an user structure being used instead of the ME
as the subject of the action “posted a comment”. As this example illustrates, the
user structure corresponds to a pseudonym for the peer. For achieving a high
degree of privacy/unlinkability, different user structures (i.e. different transaction
pseudonyms) could be used for different actions.
More in general, Fig. 2 shows how user structures and profiles enhance privacy
by providing indirect and partial access to the information from the Peer and its
Main Entity, which may contain identifying information about the subject and
additional personal data.
Profiles as object indirections. Instead of directly allowing access to the
information contained in the peer’s entities, Profile structures are created to reply
to queries that are sent to the peer (normally only revealing partial or obfuscated
information about these entities). The right side of Fig. 2 shows an example
where, upon receiving a read query, the peer allows the requester to access the
Profile named “Profile2”, which contains partial and obfuscated information from
ME but not ME, which may contain personal data that the subject may not
want to disclose. Profile structures, when they refer to ME, may represent partial
identities of the subject controlling the Peer.
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Fig. 3. An example containing Entities, simplified profile definitions and profile materi-
alizations for sharing an Event Entity.
The profile structure definition PD is used to define the subset of information
to be included in the profile from the ME. A profile definition is defined as the
tuple PD = 〈ID, PE, {PP}, {GP}, {NR}〉 where:
– ID is a numeric unique identifier. It is a reference to the PD;
– PE is the id of the Profiled Entity, the entity to which this profile refers to;
– {PP} is a non-empty set that specifies the different parameters that feed the
algorithms that are to be applied to the profiled entity to obtain the profile,
both this set of parameters and the algorithms are entity type-dependent
(although future versions may consider its generalization);
– {GP} is a possibly empty set that contains the id of all Generated Profiles
obtained from the current definition, and;
– {NR} represent the Negotiation Requirements that need to be complied
by the parties wanting to have access to the information that this profile
definition will generate.
Applying a profile definition to the Entity it refers to materializes the actual
Profile into an Entity Profile structure. An Entity Profile is defined as the tuple
EP = 〈ID,U, S, {A}, {R}, {AR}〉 where:
– ID is a numeric unique identifier
– U is the id of the user structure that was the source of this profile
– {A} is a set of attributes defined as before but the specific attribute definitions
and values may be different from the ones in the entity.
– {R} is a set of relations defined as before but the specific relation definitions
and values may be different from the ones in the entity.
– {AR} is the possibly empty set of Agreed Requirements set between source
user structure of the profile (U) and the owner of this entity instance, this
property can be checked to make sure that the terms or agreements are not
breached.
The profile definition structure (i.e., the filter to apply to the original informa-
tion before sharing it) is stored at the source peer’s storage while the materialized
Profile structure (containing the shared partial and/or obfuscated information)
is stored at the destination peer’s storage, as shown in the example illustrated in
Fig. 3.
The left part of Fig. 3 shows an Event (family lunch) that belongs to a
professor’s Peer. The professor created two profile definition structures, which
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are presented here in a simplified manner, to define how this event is shared to
assistants and students. The rest of the figure shows the peer structures that
belong to the subjects with the materialized profiles created from applying the
restrictions from the profile definition. These materializations include examples
of omitted pieces of information (e.g. the ‘food’ attribute is not shared in neither
profile) and partial/obfuscated information (e.g. the time of the event becomes
‘Midday’). It is important to note that the realisation of these materializations
requires the formalisation of functions that can provide different levels of ab-
stractions for the original information, subjects should be able then to select a
particular level during the creation of a profile definition. However, such formal
definition is out of the scope of this paper and is left as part of our future work.
The use of the information contained in the materialized Profiles is restricted
by the Agreed Requirement attribute which is a agreed upon privacy policy
based on ppl [18]. Policy enforcement at the platform-level guarantees that the
shared information is only used for the stated purposes, which are specified in
the attribute level. For example, if profiles are used to share contact information,
e.g. the professor gives her telephone number to her assistant, the professor may
restrict its use to “call over phone only”. Therefore, any other operation over the
data, such as reading or copying the telephone number is not allowed, i.e., the
assistant may call the professor but the actual phone number is not revealed to
the assistant.
5 Conclusions
This paper provides an initial discussion of privacy and other ethical issues of
peer profiling within the scope of the Smart Society project. It also presents the
concept of a privacy-enhanced Peer Manager, which is a fundamental building
block for the implementation of a privacy-preserving cas computing platform.
As presented in Section 4, the Peer Manager allows people and other actors, such
as sensors and actuators, to store their information in a secure and preserving
framework. The design and development of the Peer Manager followed three core
guiding principles for enforcing legal privacy principles including the principles
of data minimisation, purpose binding, transparency and user control.
1. Separation of information among peers.
2. A user-centered identity management.
3. A novel approach to peer profiling.
The representation of the information stored by the Peer Manager follows
a semantic schema that defines an attribute-based representation of a peer’s
characteristics. The Peer Manager allows people (i.e. users) to define profiles
that contain and reveal only partial or obfuscated information that are used
for replying to information requests and is thus enforcing data minimisation. In
addition, the purposes and use of personal data are specified and limited by a
ppl privacy policy.
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The Peer Manager addresses the presented challenges of information profiling,
such as the lack of information and feedback about how profile data is collected
and traded, by giving transparency and control of this process to the actual
subject that the profile refers to. Hence, subjects can create their own profiles
with the minimal amount of information needed and share this information with
the promise that their requirements will be enforced by the platform and that
the shared data will not be misused or traded against their will. Other features
of the platform partially reduce issues like social sorting (profiled users may not
consent giving information for these purposes or create a new pseudonyms to
avoid them altogether), diminishing diversity (the greater expressiveness of the
semantic schema provides more diversity to data and its representation) and
improve self-determination (for the same reasons as the previous two).
It is important to emphasize that the current version of the approach does
not completely solve the issues raised in the workshop and that it also introduces
potential new issues such information management complexity for users and
going against some of the popular business models related to data management.
Management complexity refers to the fact that giving full control of the
information could become overwhelming to it owners; specially at the scale in
which personal information is produced. For this reason, it is key for the future
adoption and practicability of this approach to present itself as an extension of
existing identity management systems. While some people may not be interested
in fine-grained privacy settings, we plan to provide the possibility to individuals
to review and change their privacy settings in a usable way.
It is also worth considering that companies and platforms that base their
revenue on the harvesting, processing and reselling customer information may
initially be reluctant to give back to their customers more control over their
information. There are however, other organizations (e.g. public utilities, health
organizations) that value much highly the trust that their customers have in
them. Moreover, this higher-degree of customer trust and sense of being in control
may also make setting partial limits and transparency settings beneficial to some
of the applications that do use this information as source of revenue.
The close attention we pay to privacy and social values for profiles within
Smart Society does not mean that all difficulties are circumvented - there are a
host of future challenges too. We have to be continually vigilant over whether
autonomy and self-determination are indeed preserved by the envisaged technical
measures are implementing to protect profiles within Smart Society. For example,
despite having the tools to control circulation of their data, a participant may still
feel compelled to disclose an item to the system if refusing to do so leaves them
materially disadvantaged. This means that we have to keep sight of the wider
governance of Smart Society at the same time as we focus at specific technical
means that preserve privacy locally.
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